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Articles
  • Innovation, Regulation, and Corporate Governance in Chinese Banking   [MASS 2012]
  • Author(s)
  • Qingkui Ma, Chunjuan Cai
  • ABSTRACT
  • We attempt to explain how the collaboration of innovation, regulation, and corporate governance can expedite the banking development in China. Innovation can improve banking efficiency, and also lead to instability. Regulation can control risks effectively, while it causes the moral hazard. Fortunately, corporate governance can mitigate it. That is, these three aspects can remedy one another's shortcomings, and will work more effectively if they coordinate with one another. These results raise a cautionary attempt regarding Chinese government policies that rely excessively on the regulation of bank activities. Our ¿ndings instead reveal that innovation, regulation, and corporate governance should be adopted together to promote the development of Chinese banking.
  • KEYWORDS
  • Chinese banking; innovation; regulation; corporate governance
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