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Articles
  • OpenAccess
  • The Full Information Feedback in Minimum-Effort Game: An Experiment  [QEC 2016]
  • DOI: 10.4236/jss.2016.45003   PP.15 - 19
  • Author(s)
  • Yang Huang, Yuhang Fu, Ya Zhou, Keqiang Li
  • ABSTRACT

  • We report an experiment designed to test for the impact of giving more information feedback about others’ choices in the previous period on coordination in a repeated minimum-effort game. We consider full and limit feedback treatments. Our results indicate that full feedback group coor- dinates at higher level of effort and more group in full feedback treatment reach equilibrium and coordination success than limit feedback group. Compared to the previous studies, we can observe the coordination outcome in the long run by repeating the game 50 times and full feedback is giving the subjects full information about others’ choices in this period and historical choices in last 10 periods in the group.

  • KEYWORDS
  • Minimum-Effort Game, Coordination, Information Feedback, Experiments
  • References
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