• OpenAccess
  • A Game-Theoretic Model for Bystanders’ Behaviour in Classes with Bullying  [EPASP 2015]
  • DOI: 10.4236/jss.2015.39015   PP.97 - 102
  • Author(s)
  • Yuriko Isada, Nobuko Igaki, Aiko Shibata
  • In this paper, the behaviour of bystanders in a classroom in which bullying is occurring is analyzed using Game theory. We focus on bystander’s behaviour and formulate a threshold model. Our analysis shows that as class sizes become smaller, the probability of bullying being stopped increases.

  • Bullying, Free Rider, Non-Corporative Game
  • References
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    Morita, Y. (2010) Ijime to ha nani ka [What Is Bullying]. Chuko Shinsho, Tokyo.
    Shibata, A., Mori, T., Okamura, M. a Soyama, N. (2008) An Economic Analysis of Apathetic Behavior: Theory and Experiment. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 37, 90-107.
    Glass, G.V. and Smith, M.L. (1979) Meta-Analysis of Research on Class Size and Achievement. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 1, 2-16.
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    Nash, J. (1950) Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. Proceed-ings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36, 48-49.
    Nash, J. (1951) Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics Second Series, 54, 286-295.

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