Internal Capital Allocation Incentive Model of Enterprise Groups

Articles

Internal Capital Allocation Incentive Model of Enterprise Groups [MASS 2012]
Author(s)
Gao Yongru
ABSTRACT
Based on principal-agent theory, the essay will deal with the issue of incentive model between the CEO of Enterprise Group Headquarters and branch manager. In this essay, principal-agent incentive model is established with asymmetric information, and we also analyze the characteristics of the investment risk-sharing model between headquarters and divisions and incentive model so as to draw a few conclusions which are of reference value for practice.
KEYWORDS
enterprise groups; internal capital allocation; incentives; principal-agent
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